Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by tptacek on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @01:00PM
(#414455)
RapidSSL's total lack of acknowledgement or response to this problem on their front page is not a huge confidence builder for me.
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Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by cscott on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @03:50PM
(#414655)
RapidSSL is owned by GeoTrust, which is owned by Verisign.
You can read all about GeoTrust's certificate practices here: http://www.geotrust.com/resources/cps/pdfs/GeoTrustCPS-Versi...
The results of their KPMG audit here: https://cert.webtrust.org/SealFile?seal=650&file=pdf
And their entry into Mozilla here: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=409236
Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by tptacek on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @04:02PM
(#414673)
Of course, all the KPMG audit really says is "GeoTrust has a policy about checking the documentation of people who request certificates", and there's part of the problem: there's no way for a CA to make an attestation that they've implemented the technology competantly, because no third party will certify that attestation.
Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by timf on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @07:37PM
(#414904)
If you just read:
"RapidSSL's total lack of acknowledgement or response to this problem on their front page"
See:
Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by timf on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @02:52PM
(#414575)
I wonder what their $10,000 warranty applies to, I can't find any details on the site.
Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by tptacek on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @02:56PM
(#414582)
The person who manages to get their "Live Chat" people to respond to questions about this (perhaps by asking as a "prospective customer concerned about stories in the news") is going win a Hacker News karma bonanza.