Re:Creating a rogue CA certificate with MD5 hash collisions
by tptacek on Tuesday December 30, 2008 @12:54PM
(#414440)
They're also using an unpublished variant of the chosen-prefix attack, which presumably is what allows them to win the weekend race to generate a collision with a predicted timestamp/serial pair.
We're also focusing on the algorithm, but not really accounting for the fact that simply owning a cluster of PS3s doesn't give you the optimized math code that generates the birthday bits during the weekend window. That code is itself presumably harder to write than any zero-day exploit.
I have root certificates in my browser that are valid from 1998 to 2018. It's not so easy to verify that this attack didn't already happen 5 or even 10 years ago.
Personally I think it's extremely unlikely, especially since the chosen prefix collision attack they used has only been public for less than two years, but how could you know for sure?