Re:CrowdStrike accepting the PwnieAwards for "most epic fail...
by 0xBDB on Tuesday August 13, 2024 @05:30PM
(#41240068)
> I am positive that people in hospitals died as a direct result of this incident.
I'm less positive than you, just because my experience of healthcare infosec is that all a doctor has to do is say "I cannot be slowed down or prevented from doing x or people will die" and that's the end of any process or technical controls on x.
Same with utilities. I've seen the ICS engineers say "No you cannot put a password on this console because I may need instant access to prevent a blackout / explosion" and that pretty much ends the discussion.
Often that's not even wrong. Of course when there is a security incident there'll be a kneejerk reaction to that, and of course that's why ransomware groups love healthcare, but in the meantime, those risks seem reasonable.
Which means I'm guessing Crowdstrike killed a lot of healthcare billing but not a lot of critical care systems because it got ripped off those 30 seconds after install if it was ever installed at all.
I'm less positive than you, just because my experience of healthcare infosec is that all a doctor has to do is say "I cannot be slowed down or prevented from doing x or people will die" and that's the end of any process or technical controls on x.
Same with utilities. I've seen the ICS engineers say "No you cannot put a password on this console because I may need instant access to prevent a blackout / explosion" and that pretty much ends the discussion.
Often that's not even wrong. Of course when there is a security incident there'll be a kneejerk reaction to that, and of course that's why ransomware groups love healthcare, but in the meantime, those risks seem reasonable.
Which means I'm guessing Crowdstrike killed a lot of healthcare billing but not a lot of critical care systems because it got ripped off those 30 seconds after install if it was ever installed at all.