If the key is only good to decrypt a random part of the movie, then the test says nothing about the success or failure of the key to decrypt the rest of the movie.
Tangentially related: what is to stop a technically inclined projectionist to use the key during the time it is valid to decrypt the movie?
I would assume that at presentation time, there is enough of decryption key material available to the projection system to cover all of the movie, otherwise a presentation would have to be interrupted as the cinemas internet goes down.
> One of those would be manna from heaven for any unsavory projectionist who wanted to make high quality copies from theater prints.
Not really. The keys and image decryption happen in a tamper-resistant "FIPS can" in the media server and then are re-encrypted and sent across a bus to the projector. Some newer projectors have the FIPS can directly inside so that there are no physically exposed interfaces with anything other than the full-blown AES encrypted frames. Having a KDM means you can play the movie but you can't ever actually get to the data.
Fun fact: before DCinema there used to be people who owned tele-cine scanners mounted in the back of flatbed trucks that would go around to theaters and pay unscrupulous employees to borrow the film for a couple hours. They'd have an very nice scan of the movie for pirate DVDs the day the movie came out.