Not even remotely correct.
Most computers that were affected by the fault needed physical remediation via safe mode boot to fix the issue because they were not able to download a fix because of being stuck in a reboot loop. The understanding is that for most cases, the fix needed to be applied by an IT technician dispatched to physically access the computer.
A week or 168 hours later, there are still many, many computers out there that remain bricked by this fault because it is so heinously difficult to fix.
"Neither the offerings nor crowdstrike tools are for use in the operation of [...] direct or indirect life-support systems [...] or any application or installation where failure could result in death, severe physical injury, or property damage."
I could imagine this was not the case if you had to physically access remote servers, or didn’t have access to bit locker recovery keys
On top of that there are companies that had failures of their own in their recovery procedures. But even with good procedures this can be a significant outage because it is not trivially reverted and would typically affect many configurations that are redundant for many other failures.
2. Your IT department shouldn't buy a product that doesn't give you control on when updates are applied.
These are 2 huge security failures from your IT department.
You can have automatic security updates with delay between non prod and prod environments so that you can detect failures or possibly intrusions.
In the OVH case, their backup system (as a whole) failed. Many customers were left with 0 data, and per the article "the court ruled the OVH backup service was not operated to a reasonable standard and failed at its purpose".
Meanwhile CrowdStrike "just" crashed their customer's kernels, for a duration of about 1 hour (during which they were 100% safe from cyber attacks!). Any remaining delays getting systems back online were (in my view) due to customers not having good enough disaster recovery plans. There's certainly grounds to argue that CrowdStrike's software was "not to a reasonable standard", but the first-order impacts (a software crash) are of a very different magnitude to permanently losing all data (as in the OVH case).
Software crashes all the time. For better or for worse, we treat software bugs as an inevitability in most industries (there are exceptions, of course). While software bugs are the "fault" of the software vendor, the job of mitigating the impacts thereof lies with the people deploying it. The only thing that makes the CrowdStrike case newsworthy, compared to all the other software crashes that happen on a daily basis, is that CrowdStrike's many customers had inserted their software into many critical pathways.
CrowdStrike sells a playing card, and customers collectively built a house with them.
(P.S. Don't treat this as a defense of CrowdStrike. I think their software sucks and was developed sloppily. I think they should face consequences for their sloppiness, I just don't think they will, under current legal frameworks. At best, maybe people will vote with their wallets, going forwards.)