It's true this isn't an IETF standard (sometimes the IETF standards just don't work in practice) but the data is still very much in the open.
Should we expect CRL stapling?
Shorter certificate lifetimes will also reduce CRL sizes.
A lot of traffic comes from browsers, or TLS stacks integrated with their host operating system, which we expect will use compressed push-based methods like Mozilla's CRLite to receive more efficient data structures as well.
One thing this announcement allows us to do is motivate us to start working on making CRL mechanisms more efficient.
So all (non-short-lived) certificates will continue to have a standard revocation checking mechanism encoded in them.
But anyways, as mcpherrinm reminded me, certificates will still have the CRL Distribution Point extension so you can forget what I said about the CCADB and just do what the RFCs say.