In the past, I've worked around this by validating the configuration of a file before attempting to run it. You bail out in a safe way during validation, but still allow a hard error during run time.
Doesn't prevent all misconfigured files, but prevents the stuff like.
The real takeaway is that we need to design systems so this kind of issue is less possible. Put less code in the kernel, use tools that prevent these kinds of issues, design computers that can roll back the system if they crash.
I agree with the amateur hour observation. But then most things seem to be.
Anyone competent that manages software at scale should generally hold the opposite opinion to this.
The lesson of "multiple parser implementations for the same thing seems bad" and "sanity checks to prevent breaking things are hard heuristics to define" such that further changes were deferred.
All that to say that I can appreciate circumstances in which satisfying "don't crash the system" in response to configuration data can actually be fairly hard to realize. It can very significantly depend on the design of the pieces in question. But I also agree that it's pretty damning.
I actually don't think it's outrageous that these files are rolled out globally, simultaneously. I'm guessing they're updated frequently and _should_ be largely benign.
What stands out to me is the fact that a bad config file can crash the system. No rollback mechanism. No safety checks. No safe, failure mode. Just BSOD.
Given the fix is simply deleting the broken file, it's astounding to me that the system's behavior is BSOD. To me, that's more damning that a bad "software update". These files seem to change often and frequently. Given they're critical path, they shouldn't have the ability to completely crash the system.