Wait, really? Does this work both ways? Do I get to demand that the service provider store the data it collects about me in a way that can't be extracted? Oh, apparently not[1]...
[1] https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/07/17/1076365/how-tech...
I'm so glad people never crammed that into the TOTP protocol. You have recovery codes you can save (which are arguably just as sensitive as the TOTP secret) and a lot of apps let you export the secret entirely.
I used an app on iOS that doesn't let you export them, and it took hours to migrate each entry one-by-one to my new Android device. Even with recovery codes, it was a pain to log in to each site and drill through their menus to disable and set up 2FA again. I should have been wary of that.
The credential is, in fact, only the user's data. How does it even make sense that a credential could be an agreement?
> The service provider has every right in the world to demand the user prove that they are securely storing the credential in a way that can't be extracted.
No, nobody has any right to dictate, or even know, how my device stores my data.
Their customers' accounts, on the other hand, are a different story. They should have freedom to choose. Companies that try to restrict that freedom should be punished in the market, or, in cases of monopoly, by the FTC. I suppose that doesn't mean it definitely shouldn't be an option in the spec, though..
The credential is not only the user's data. The credential is an agreement for access between the user and the service provider.
The service provider has every right in the world to demand the user prove that they are securely storing the credential in a way that can't be extracted.