> In which case why did they fail to prevent this?

"Oh, crowdstrike? Yeah, yeah, here's that Winodws kernel code signing key you paid for."

You can pay for it and sign a file full of null characters. Signing has nothing to do with quality from what I understand.

"Yours sincerely,

Crowdstrike

---

PS - If you get hit by some massive crash, we refer you to our company's name. What were you expecting?"

Please explain this comment. How is the Crowdstrike incident related to the Key Bridge collision?

I think he's implying there was some sort of conspiracy by foreign actors.

Drivers have had to be signed forever and pass pretty rigorous test suites and static analysis.

The problem here is obviously this other file the driver sucks in. Just because the driver didn't crash for Microsoft in their lab doesn't mean a different file can't crash it...

There’s a design problem here if the driver can’t be self-contained in such a way that it’s possible to roll back the kernel to a known good state.

How so? Preventing roll-backs on software updates is a "security feature" in most cases for better and for worse. Yeah, it would be convenient for tinkerers or in rare events such as these, but would be a security issue in the 99,9..99% of the time for enterprise users where security is the main concern.

I don't really understand this, many Linux distributions like Universal Blue advertise rollbacks as a feature. How is preventing a roll-back a "security feature"?

Imagine a driver has an exploitable vulnerability that is fixed in an update. If an attacker can force a rollback to the vulnerable older version, then the system is still vulnerable. Disallowing the rollback fixes this.

ohh

> Just because the driver didn't crash for Microsoft in their lab doesn't mean a different file can't crash it...

    "What are you complaining about? It works on my machine."™