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Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by j1elo on Tuesday June 25, 2024 @03:26PM (#40792561)
Vendoring should be the norm, not the special case.

Something like this ought to be an essential part of all package managers, and I'm thinking here that the first ones should be the thousands of devs cluelessly using NPM around the world:

https://go.dev/ref/mod#vendoring

Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by bryanlarsen on Tuesday June 25, 2024 @04:18PM (#40793104)
We've seen a lot more attacks succeed because somebody has vendored an old vulnerable library than supply chain attacks. Doing vendoring badly is worse than relying on upstream. Vendoring is part of the solution, but it isn't the solution by itself.
Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by j1elo on Tuesday June 25, 2024 @04:34PM (#40793269)
Not alone, no. That's how CI bots help a lot, such as Dependabot.

Althought it's also worrying how we seemingly need more technologies on top of technologies just to keep a project alive. It used to be just including the system's patched header & libs, now we need extra bots surveying everything...

Maybe a linux-distro-style of community dependency management would make sense. Keep a small group of maintainers busy with security patches for basically everything, and as a downstream developer just install the versions they produce.

I can visualize the artwork..."Debian but for JS"

Re:Polyfill supply chain attack hits 100K+ sites by skydhash on Monday July 01, 2024 @09:04AM (#40845463)
In the old ways, you mostly rely on a few libraries that each solve a complete problem and is backed by a proper community. The odd dependency is usually small and vendored properly. Security was mostly the environment concern (the OS) as the data is either client side or some properly managed enterprise infrastructure). Now we have npm with its microscopic and numerous packages, everyone wants to be on the web, and they all want your data.