"When we [Microsoft] initially identified that an older cryptography algorithm could be exploited and then be used to sign code as if it originated from Microsoft, we immediately began investigating Microsoft’s signing infrastructure to understand how this might be possible. What we found is that certificates issued by our Terminal Services licensing certification authority, which are intended to only be used for license server verification, could also be used to sign code as Microsoft. Specifically, when an enterprise customer requests a Terminal Services activation license, the certificate issued by Microsoft in response to the request allows code signing without accessing Microsoft’s internal PKI infrastructure."
Interesting. The Microsoft Terminal Services CA has the corporate identity, but not the corporate trust chain. Is this a deliberate back-door provided to the US government, or simply an ordinary vulnerability?
We need some sort of certification, an independent audit, of X509 certificate authorities and their trust chains. Agreed?
I probably wouldnt rush to fix a convenient exploit once discovered, though, if existing USG policies could protect against it (removing most CAs, using DOD CAs) for government operations.