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Re:Abusing url handling in iTerm2 and Hyper for code execution by vin10 on Wednesday May 22, 2024 @01:00AM (#40437497)
It is the first one, they need to be printed and clicked.
Re:Abusing url handling in iTerm2 and Hyper for code execution by Joker_vD on Wednesday May 22, 2024 @10:34AM (#40441520)
There is also another escape sequence, OSC 1337, apparently already implemented in iTerm2 [0], which makes iTerm2 open the URL instead of printing it:

    The hypothetical new control code is different because it does not display a hyperlink; it directly opens the link using the appropriate system URL handler.
[0] https://gitlab.com/gnachman/iterm2/-/issues/10994
Re:Abusing url handling in iTerm2 and Hyper for code execution by lmz on Wednesday May 22, 2024 @10:58AM (#40441835)
The commit linked there checks host only and not protocol for "always allow". I wonder if that's going to be a problem with some of the more interesting protocols.
Re:Abusing url handling in iTerm2 and Hyper for code execution by xvector on Wednesday May 22, 2024 @12:27PM (#40442828)
iTerm2 has definitely not been designed with security in mind.

It has a massive and rapidly growing attack surface and quite a bit of feature bloat (literally hundreds of "features") - I would not recommend using it over Terminal for anyone security minded.

Re:Abusing url handling in iTerm2 and Hyper for code execution by vin10 on Wednesday May 22, 2024 @03:03PM (#40444834)
It is guarded by a warning and requires explicit approval similar to browsers but yes, it does broaden the attack surface: https://gitlab.com/gnachman/iterm2/-/commit/fc9ae5c90f53cb1e...