News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by ChuckMcM on Sunday May 27, 2012 @06:46PM (#4031260)
Interesting discussion. Some denial, some tin hat, some contemplative. I think I've had all of those emotions with this sort of thing.

There are diagnostics in our network switches that allow for traffic to be replicated and sent to other ports with a different destination mac (this isn't port mirroring is more like port re-directing). Clearly in the hands of a bad guy they might set up a machine on the LAN to get a copy of all the traffic. Is it a cyberwar beach head? Probably not. Could it be exploited in an attack? Probably. Of course if someone tried to route all that traffic outside the network into the transit network it would be pretty obvious. So not a good scenario.

Like the controller back door article on Ars last month I suspect most of these things are diagnostic aids. You ask an engineer to test something and that something is buried inside a bunch of silicon and the only way to do that is to build some stuff in there that lets you look at things.

Of course you can do this in a 'smart' way, and in a 'stupid' way. When I started at Intel there were extra pads on the silicon that got to these extra functions, you ordered a 'bond-out' chip where bonding wires (between the chip pins and the silicon) would be attached. All of the in circuit emulators up to the 386 had a 'bond out' version in the emulator pod that gave you access to internal state of the chip. Others have pointed out the key for loading replacement microcode, another 'feature' to fix bugs in the field and do diagnostics.

So things which require either 'special' chips or attaching a JTAG probe directly to the part, are generally ok in my book. Once you have physical access nearly all bets are off.

Its an expensive way to compromise the enemy. Simpler to just build a piece of gear that looks and operates exactly like the original but is your own design. There was some counterfeit Cisco boxes like this in the channel for a bit. Of course they 'fail' when you update IOS and it fails. Still the cost to exploit is lower and more assured than back dooring silicon in a fab.

Its also pretty hard to add features to a chip without the designer of the chip in on the game. Every transistor is accounted for by long verification and analysis so 'extra' ones would show up. That limits the risk to a chip manufacturer being the 'bad guy' (and they are very traceable so unlikely to do that)

None of this though should take away from the excellent work Cambridge is doing. The silicon analysis is really cutting edge stuff, and I think it would be useful for chip designers in verifying their masks are accurate too. If you could effectively 'decompile' the resulting silicon and verify it against your netlist, that would catch mask errors. And that would save anywhere from $100,000 to $2,000,000 depending on size of the mask.

Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by dantiberian on Sunday May 27, 2012 @09:20PM (#4031575)
To clarify for people reading, IOS is the name of Cisco's operating system for their router's and network switches. Apple licensed the trademark from Cisco when they switched the naming of their mobile operating system.

http://blogs.cisco.com/news/cisco_and_apple_agreement_on_ios...

Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by sneak on Monday May 28, 2012 @08:22AM (#4033001)
Earth is case-sensitive:

iOS == Apple's mobile OS

IOS == Internetwork OS (Cisco gear)

Further:

Mac == Macintosh

MAC == Media Access Control (Address), common in configuration of Cisco equipment...

Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by h84ru3a on Monday May 28, 2012 @06:19PM (#4035165)
Are we sure that "=" and not "==" is the correct operator?

If "==" was appropriate then there would be no problem of ambiguity. And there would be no need for the clarification. Because meanings could never change with context. There could be no "misinterpretation". Only the truth table result of "false".

Which is more important in human communication: case-sensitivity or context-sensitivity?

Human communication is not a computer program.

Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by InclinedPlane on Monday May 28, 2012 @12:11AM (#4031895)
Confusingly, IBM's mainframes run on the "i" operating system.
Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by derleth on Monday May 28, 2012 @12:32AM (#4031941)
i series aren't mainframes, they're midrange, the replacement for the AS/400 platform. Mainframe stuff is z series, a replacement for the System/390 line.
Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by bkmartin on Monday May 28, 2012 @07:10AM (#4032861)
And the official term would be IBM i running on Power Systems. Damn IBM and their ever changing name of the most stable platform available.
Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by excuse-me on Monday May 28, 2012 @12:46PM (#4034062)
If you can't pick it up and throw it out of the window it's a mainframe.
Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by lifeisstillgood on Monday May 28, 2012 @02:14AM (#4032202)
I'm sorry I am not sure what you are saying here. It seems to be "this is far more likely to be a test engineers backdoor that was not on the spec" then a Chinese backdoor added at the fab"

with no evidence either way, I am guessing that US intelligence (and others?) are loudly saying this is happening not because they can prove it in silicon but convincing human intelligence has told them

I happen to think that the techniques developed to analysis silicon are going to be useful all round, and that a backdoor in a chip does not make a successful cyber attack in the wild, but if these are real in-the-fab additions then the implications are so large we should be prepared to not label this "it's just a test component" and look at ideas like validating silicon (noted somewherre else below)

Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by mhurron on Monday May 28, 2012 @08:07AM (#4032967)
> with no evidence either way, I am guessing that US intelligence (and others?) are loudly saying this is happening not because they can prove it in silicon but convincing human intelligence has told them

My instincts would be that in the absence of real evidence they are 'loudly saying this is happening' to beat the war drums, declare it as proof a 'cyberwar' is happening, are using it to get more funding and preparing for new draconian measures to control it both domestically and internationally.

Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by ChuckMcM on Monday May 28, 2012 @03:13PM (#4034583)
You are correct, there is no evidence either way. So one way to look at it is to consider what would have to be true for it to be installed by the 'fab' without the knowledge of the guy who designed the chip, vs installed by the chip designer.

Given what I know of silicon chip manufacturing, and the verification that goes on during, after, and while, manufacturing. I assert it would be extraordinarily difficult for a fab operator (like TSMC) to insert a back door without the designer/manufacturer knowing it.

I also brought up that in my experience adding back doors was certainly done to aid in testability. Sometimes those aids are done in a way that they cannot be used by third parties (bond-out chips) and sometimes they could be (JTAG access) but are obscured in some way.

Backdoor access in the firmware however, is a much easier threat to actualize as it doesn't involve silicon hacking per se. So that is a more credible threat. And I mentioned that we've seen counterfeit versions of 'name brand' products already which would be a fairly straight forward threat.

Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by jasonwatkinspdx on Monday May 28, 2012 @03:11AM (#4032315)
The NSA has it's own fab resources. That fact alone tells you everything you need to know. The only remaining question is to what extent is it cost effective to still use suspect parts.
Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by Symmetry on Monday May 28, 2012 @08:42AM (#4033056)
Not surprising, given how important custom ASICs are for serious codebreaking.
Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by lifeisstillgood on Monday May 28, 2012 @06:49AM (#4032819)
Sorry, the NSA has it's own billion dollar fab soitcan build copyrighted Intel clones?

I simply don't get it?

* what happens when Intel release the nextgenration of chips? Apparently Intel needs to rebuild a while new fab plant at x billion - does the NSA? * do they trust the designs made by Intel? If not what do they do ? If Intel is introducing backdoors for the NSA what guarantee is tere those backdoors won't get used y someone else? * if they do trustthe design but don't trust the fab process surely it is better to put armed guard in the fab room or similar checks * and this is only for one generation of one class of chip. Do this for the chips in the CCTV cameras and the door locks and the ...

Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by jasonwatkinspdx on Monday May 28, 2012 @08:10PM (#4035445)
Well, AFAIK the NSA doesn't publish what their fabs are capable of or what they do with them. Maybe someone here knows better?

I'd assume the NSA's fabrication capability is more on the scale of the pilot plants fabs build at each new process scale. Some universities certainly have fabrication equipment testbeds as well, so the NSA effort may be more that modest scale.

If I were tasked with the problems the NSA faces, I think I'd at least focus in on:

1. CMOS reverse engineering equipment that can shave down dies, image and analyze the structures, etc.

2. Small scale fabrication for extremely sensitive infrastructure. These roles probably aren't performance critical. Eg if you have some microcontroller that plays a role in say nuclear weapon arming protocols, you need that to be pretty much beyond suspicion.

3. Some way of sampling commodity parts for unexpected behavior non-destructively. If this could be done efficiently enough, you could use it in combination with #1 to get reasonable confidence for off the shelf parts.

One thing I'd suspect is that if the NSA did find highly targeted flaws they probably wouldn't disseminate that fact unless absolutely necessary. Keep an adversary using a strategy you know rather than provoking improvement.

Personally I doubt the NSA forces backdoors into commodity chips. In theory there might be some way of introducing a flaw that would cripple specific large computations like crypto-analysis of a particular code, or biasing a particular random number generator. But that just seems too likely to backfire.

I'd always thought it was interesting that the pentium FDIV bug was most easily found by code calculating twin primes. But there may be a mundane explanation for that rather than cloak and dagger stuff.

Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by Zaak on Monday May 28, 2012 @03:16AM (#4032327)
Does the NSA have its own fabs to keep back doors out or to keep secrets in?
Re:Backdoor found in a China-made US military chip by redthrowaway on Monday May 28, 2012 @04:32AM (#4032490)
Both, likely.