Re:Native Client: Google's craziest idea yet
by stcredzero on Thursday December 18, 2008 @11:38PM
(#403026)
Ah, so you're talking about capabilities? I thought you were arguing in favor of the other guy's position -- that there's nothing you can do about malicious apps. (And maybe in the face of ignorant and gullible users, there ultimately is nothing, but lets leave social engineering out of this for now.)
I just didn't want to explain capabilities for the nth time, so I thought I'd throw the OLPC at him. Even a sandboxing scheme like the OLPC's addresses his objections. Not sure if it was supposed to nest.
Re:Native Client: Google's craziest idea yet
by kragen on Friday December 19, 2008 @12:14AM
(#403051)
There are lots of ways of implementing sandboxing; I think capability systems are the most elegant and flexible, but I don't know for sure that they are the best way, given that the judge is the messy real world, not mathematical abstractions.
I was arguing that the other guy was right that sandboxing in itself is not sufficient; you still do need to have a way to deal with code that you give the full run of your system, even if you keep the amount of that code to a minimum.
If your files belong to your applications instead of to you, or if your sandboxes don't nest, then your sandboxing scheme is pretty lame.
Most of the time there are worse cases than just deleting your documents: the utility could send all of your documents to its owner over the internet. You can prevent this with sandboxing policies too; KeyKOS solved an analogous problem in the context of a multiuser non-networked mainframe. More difficult is to keep it from inserting backdoors into your programs or subtly corrupting your files.
I don't see how the solution "then you roll back to your previous backup" is dependent upon only the utility only having access to a single sandbox. It seems like it works just as well if you give it access to everything except your basic UI (and the TCB it depends on, e.g. the kernel, the bootloader) and your backups.