Re:Passkey Implementation: Misconceptions, pitfalls and unkn...
by ffo on Friday May 03, 2024 @05:45AM
(#40245833)
Yes but the same logic about loosing the secret applies to passwords and any other factors (given we ignore a potential reset process)
Providers will most of the time allow to register multiple passkeys or other authentication means, hopefully ;-) which has its own downsides.
I am well aware how the internals work of keystores. But the benefit with "client certs" is that on mTLS you get added benefits besides where the key is stored. And that is that you can "prevent" mitm attacks.
But I guess that is a subject for another thread.
Re:Passkey Implementation: Misconceptions, pitfalls and unkn...
by formerly_proven on Friday May 03, 2024 @05:51AM
(#40245882)
Resident passkeys really are just the 2020-JavaScript version of X.509-based mutual authentication - naturally it's incompatible with anything but the web, sits on a weird level of the stack, and is somehow even less transparent to the user. On the other hand, certificate slots still seem to run approximately a dollar each.
If I have "n" private keys for an account, I can use another private key and revoke the lost/compromised one. It's that simple.
Your secure enclave is not much different electronically from a smart card with a biometric password actually. People think Passkeys as SSH keys on disk, but it's more of a long private key on a single-way secure enclave. This is why people cry "platform lock-in". It's platform lock-in, but it's a secondary effect. It's actually a "proper HSM, but integrated".