My conclusion is we tend to overestimate our understanding and the power of our inventions.
I stand by my position that having a mathematical proof of computational universality is a significant difference that separates today from all prior eras that sought to understand the brain through contemporaneous technology.
That’s not what I’m talking about. This is a basic analysis topic:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stone%E2%80%93Weierstrass_th...
At least mid 1800s for a proof. 1700s also explored Fourier series.
> stand by my position
And you’re still ignoring the cybernetics, and perceptrons movement I keep referring to which was more than 100 years ago, and informed by Turing.
It's the same basic flaw: requiring continuous functions. Not all functions are continuous, therefore this is not sufficient.
> And you’re still ignoring the cybernetics, and perceptrons movement I keep referring to which was more than 100 years ago, and informed by Turing.
What about them? As long as they're universal, they can all simulate brains. Anything after Church and Turing is just window dressing. Notice how none of these new ideas claimed to change what could in principle be computed, only how much easier or more natural this paradigm might be for simulating or creating brains.
It’s also a different reason than Taylor series which uses differentiability.
You do not understand this subject. Please read before repeating this: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_approximation_theo...
> what about them
Then you seem to have lost the subject of the thread.