Are either of those things true? Is there some other difficulty?
I'm implying both. First, if they'd have shrugged off the early pressure to take on too much VC money, they wouldn't have been propped up with an indefinite runway and would have been forced to get creative, and quickly, with monetization. They'd probably be in much stronger shape today, because they'd have had to scale up profitability in line with operating costs and userbase. (At least to some greater extent than they were).
Second, because they're now public, they're having to crash-develop profitability while still being held to the fire to make quarterly projections.
I'm aware of the apparent contradiction in what I'm saying here, i.e., does it really make a difference when their feet are or were held to the fire to grow revenue? At least in my preferred scenario, they'd have been forced to deal with it early. Before growing to 1 billion users -- all of whom expect the service to be 100% free -- and going public to the equity markets -- who expect those users to be monetized pretty much overnight.
Their business strategy was clearly to rapidly gain default status and solidify the barrier to entry of being the de-facto social network... by monetizing you either piss off or scare away users, or decrease your eyeballs (that you can sell in-aggregate to advertisers).
Sooner or later, Facebook was always going to have to monetize. Its deliberate strategy of putting off monetization until it became a de facto standard social network was a gamble. It seemed reasonable at the time to many inside and outside of Facebook. But my point is that, knowing what it was gambling on, Facebook shouldn't have taken in so much money that it was forced to go public before its gamble was ready to pay off. Now, it's going to have to start monetizing quickly and massively, come hell or high water -- at a time when it still doesn't quite know how to do so without pissing off its userbase. It's in a worst-of-both-worlds scenario, which could have been avoided regardless of its user growth vs. monetization strategy.
To me, this cautionary tale is every bit as much about VC funding bubbles as it is about advertising bubbles. Sure, Facebook could never have been bootstrapped to its current scale. But it could have stopped taking on such massive amounts of funding, and, instead, opted for more organic growth until it found time to perfect its ad products and business model.
When we talk about the Dotcom Bubble of the mid 90s, we talk about a frenzied funding (and IPOing) of companies with little more than userbases and unproven (or occasionally nonsensical) business models. Facebook is not that, exactly. It's more userbase than business, but that doesn't necessarily have to be the case. Unfortunately, it was funded (excessively) in Dotcom Bubble fashion, and forced to IPO in Dotcom Bubble mode: grow insanely fast, worry about profitability later.
That it happened to benefit, temporarily, from a misguided advertising bubble is material, but also somewhat incidental.