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A comment on Hotel WiFi JavaScript Injection (2012). Parent comment

Re:Hotel WiFi JavaScript Injection (2012) by tdtd on Friday April 26, 2024 @05:40PM (#40174631)
If the network’s owner was the one doing DNS redirects, couldn’t they just instead use the IP address in the DNSSEC-signed record themselves? I don’t think DNSSEC is a robust protection if you don’t trust the network you’re connected to.
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Re:Hotel WiFi JavaScript Injection (2012) by lmz on Friday April 26, 2024 @08:00PM (#40175685)
This would break the chain of trust (you wouldn't trust the network's key signing the address for that zone).
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Re:Hotel WiFi JavaScript Injection (2012) by tdtd on Friday April 26, 2024 @08:51PM (#40176053)
The attacker doesn’t resign the DNS record with their own key, they just let the legitimately signed record though and use the IP address in that legitimate record themselves. If someone owns the network (or is an active MitM) they can control where IP addresses route to.
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Re:Hotel WiFi JavaScript Injection (2012) by tptacek on Saturday April 27, 2024 @07:29PM (#40184569)
They don't even have to do that. If they control the network, they can just set the AD flag to 'true' in a forged DNS response.
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