The 10% estimate is not mine, it's from a legitimate expert who regularly goes to the frontline in Ukraine.
[1]: An amusing anecdote from that podcast: Tesla battery packs are a big source of batteries for FPV drones. The packs can be sourced for next to nothing from totaled Teslas, and individual cells are very reliable.
[2]: https://www.twz.com/ukrainians-are-cutting-open-u-s-cluster-...
[3]: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/17/ukraine-frontline-ammo-...
AI is not the limiting factor as much as sensors, energy, datalinks, logistics, and costs are. Yes we can miniaturise TERCOM now, but then where would the vehicle get maps from (battlefields change!), how would it see the terrain (at night? on a foggy, rainy day? deliberately dazzled/blinded with a cheap laser?), how far can it travel, how much payload can it take, where does it launch from, and how does it get to the launch point? Working through those questions and anticipating cycles of adaptation, I think it's easy to end up with a $1m JASSM-ER or a $3k 155mm shell (neither of which Ukrainians have in sufficient numbers).
For example, if you know there's an enemy platoon in that forest, why would you fly a swarm of autonomous tree-avoiding hunter drones there if you can drop some 155mm instead? The enemy can't blind a 155mm shell, EW wouldn't work, shells don't care about fog or darkness, payload-to-weight ratio is ~100%, and they're cheap. Of course if you don't have shells you have to be creative, but that doesn't mean the creative solutions are better.
On the other hand, according to the episode I linked, humble unarmed non-AI DJI Mavics have a very persistent and systemic impact. They provide 24/7 eyes in the sky over the entire front line, which makes tactical surprise impossible. This is very much not "AI swarming slaughterbots" many seem to imagine and invisible to folks on the sidelines like us, but that's why I'd be cautious of making inferences from the media we get to see.
And that was mostly right; that's why fast attack craft, the modern evolution of torpedo boats, are still a thing, while battleships have been relegated to the graveyard of history.
The top end of course got much bigger, CVNs displace almost twice as much as Yamato.
HMS Dreadnought: Length: 160m / Beam: 25m / Displacement: 18410t
Acorn-class destroyer (contemporary with Dreadnought): Length: 75m / Beam: 8m / Displacement: 780t
Burke Flight III: Length: 155m / Beam: 20m / Displacement: 9900t
Less than 10% is not good when you consider how much does it cost in practice. Drone teams are often 2 pilots + technician + explosives technician (an incredibly risky job btw, those bastardised RPG warheads are live and sensitive) + infantry cover. At least double that if you want to strike beyond line of sight and need a retransmitter drone. Those teams can only move at night and on foot because they are actively hunted by the other side. They can only have one or two drones simultaneously in the air at best, and the drones need to get to their targets first without giving away the launch point. All of that for less than 10% success rate is not "incredibly effective".
Now compare to fire-and-forget Javelins that are way more lethal and are just something added to a normal infantry platoon.
Of course they did, arguing anything else is complete lunacy, especially since you later advocate for the usage of Javelins, which, if effective and available, obviously reduce the value of tank. They also have the imense drawback of exposing the soldier to enemy fire.
I don't even get your other points. Why would drone operators be hunted more than Javelin operators? Why would Javelin operators not have to worry about giving away their position? Why don't Javelin operators need infantry cover?
Tanks' value doesn't come from their invulnerability. They weren't invulnerable since WW1, if ever. Their value comes from being better than alternatives.
As for Javelins, Javelins don't need operators that have to sit still and blind, guiding their slow drones to targets. Javelins don't need dedicated operator teams, US army more or less hands them to infantry platoons as needed. Javelins don't need "infantry cover", their operators are infantry. Javelins are fire and forget, so you can shoot and immediately leave, unlike drone teams. Javelins don't require extensive training and fine skill.
The only thing Javelins don't do is first person videos. See my original point about drawing wrong conclusions from footage we get to see.
ATGMs did lower the value of tanks, but not to 0. Anything that can knock out a weapons system decreases the value of that weapons system.
It's an unavoidable dilemma: commodity stuff is cheap, but easily countered; stuff that isn't easy to counter isn't commodity and isn't cheap. You probably heard "yes but you can JUST add a jamming-resistant radio, and a thermal camera, and autonomous recognition/coordination, and larger payload, and…", but that's just motte-and-bailey.
Plus the drones still need the payload. If they are used against armour, they need shaped charges, which aren't free. In practice they often get random RPG-7 HEAT warheads from Soviet stockpiles, but we can't compare that with newly manufactured western 155mm HE.
A Howitzer itself ranges from $2m - 3.7m USD each.
Take FPV drones. In [1] Michael Kofman estimates (based on talking to a number of frontline units) that on average <10% of FPV drone strikes on armour are successful. The success being a mission kill, not a spectacular turret toss we see on twitter/reddit/telegram. Every strike requires a large support team, strikes can't be massed (because of radio interference and EW), the efficiency is dropping over time because of cheap adaptations (EW, nets/cages, smoke), and the drones aren't that cheap and much less suppressive than 155mm shells. A layperson relying on stuff on social networks would have no way of knowing this, and think of FPV drones as this incredibly effective weapon making tanks (and helicopters) obsolete.
Or TB2s. Remember how they were the future of warfare after their success in Nagorno-Karabakh and the first few weeks in Ukraine? Few months later TB2s completely disappeared from the media, and I don't think many people are aware of how useless they became.
More generally, I think we're seeing a repeat of the century old debate over torpedo boats. People saw how torpedo boats were much cheaper than battleships and thought "hey we can have many of those boats, it'll be cheaper and more lethal". Turns out that range, coordination, sensing, targeting, and logistics are so difficult a smaller number of more capable platforms in well trained hands is both more effective and efficient.
In that analogy, those CCA drones are [torpedo boat] destroyers, not torpedo boats. A small number of somewhat cheaper, but still expensive platforms dependent on the exquisite core of the fleet (battleships, carriers, F-35s, or AH-64s) that doesn't go anywhere.
[1]: https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/mike-kofman-and-rob-lee-on...