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Re:Timeline of the xz open source attack by eadmund on Tuesday April 02, 2024 @01:13PM (#39908229)
I think that what we need is good sandboxing. All a sandboxed Turing-complete language can do is perform I/O on some restricted area, burn CPU and attempt to escape the sandbox.

I would like to see this on the language level, not just on the OS level.

Re:Timeline of the xz open source attack by semi-extrinsic on Tuesday April 02, 2024 @01:47PM (#39908664)
I have been thinking the exact same thing, and specifically I would like to try implementing something that works with the Rye python manager.

Say I have a directory with a virtualenv and some code that needs some packages from PyPI. I would very much like to sandbox anything that runs in this virtualenv to just disk access inside that directory, and network access only to specifically whitelisted URLs. As a user I should only need to add "sandbox = True" to the pyproject.toml file, and optionally "network_whitelist = [...]".

From my cursory looking around, I believe Cloudflare sandbox utils, which are convenience wrappers around systemd Seccomp, might be the best starting point.

Edit: or just use Firejail, interesting...

You mention sandboxing on the language level, but I don't think it is the way. Apparently sandboxing within Python itself is a particularly nasty rabbit hole that is ultimately unfruitful because of Python's introspection capabilities. You will find many dire warnings on that path.