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Re:The failed attempt to backdoor SSH globally – that got ca... by JeremyNT on Monday April 01, 2024 @09:35AM (#39894036)
> (Note, also, that linking libsystemd into sshd was a downstream patch.)

I feel like a lot of people are really glossing over this point. What's happened here is that Red Hat and Debian have made a choice to patch OpenSSH in a way that opened it up to this attack.

It's a little ironic that e.g. Arch, which actually shipped the malicious code to end users since it publishes changes so much faster, as shipped never would have executed the payload (because they didn't patch OpenSSH).

Re:The failed attempt to backdoor SSH globally – that got ca... by LtWorf on Monday April 01, 2024 @05:02PM (#39899285)
But it's nice when your init knows when a service is ready and can start the other stuff that depends on that one… Otherwise you're in retry hell.
Re:The failed attempt to backdoor SSH globally – that got ca... by jchw on Monday April 01, 2024 @08:57PM (#39901221)
Honestly, I'm a bit curious why sshd startup would ever be significant. Not sure.

The most intensive operation I can think of that might happen at sshd startup would be host key generation, but at least in NixOS it looks like this is actually handled in an ExecStartPre= script, which I believe means it will happen before After= units execute.

Of course I sincerely doubt that distributions decided to add sd_notify support just for the hell of it, so I am sure there is a reason, it's just not overtly obvious, especially considering plenty of distros don't do this and sshd (and dependent units presumably) certainly seems to work absolutely fine.

Re:The failed attempt to backdoor SSH globally – that got ca... by LtWorf on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @06:28PM (#39924092)
Well I guess CI automations could use that.
Re:The failed attempt to backdoor SSH globally – that got ca... by dralley on Monday April 01, 2024 @09:37PM (#39901460)
>It's a little ironic that e.g. Arch, which actually shipped the malicious code to end users since it publishes changes so much faster, as shipped never would have executed the payload (because they didn't patch OpenSSH).

The backdoor was designed to only be injected during the building of an RPM or Debian package. Arch never would have been impacted no matter what choices they made. They were trying to hit production systems while minimizing their potential exposure to other less important types of users beforehand.