Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com...
by ds-tech_media on Sunday March 31, 2024 @05:32AM
(#39882744)
You're correct about a great many things.
State actors do things in broad-daylight, get exposed, and it's no fuss to them at all.
But that depends on which "sphere of influence" you live in.
Russia and China have made major changes to key parts of their critical infrastructure based on revelations that might only result in a sub-committee in US Congress.
But to establish a significant contributor to a key piece of software, not unlike xz, is an ideal position for a state actor. The developer doesn't even need to know who/why, but they could be financially/ideologically aligned. This is what intelligence officers do. They manage real human assets who exist naturally. But to have someone long-established as an author of a project is the exact type of asset they want. Even if they push the code, people immediately start considering how it could have been done by someone else. Yes, it's conspiratorial/paranoid thinking but there's nothing more paranoid than state intelligence trade craft.
They don't even need plausible deniability, groups like the NSA have been caught spying on everyone and it doesn't hurt them all that much. The publicity isn't ideal. But it only confirms what we already new - turns out the spies are spying on people! Who knew.
There are probably dozens if not hundreds of this sort of attempt going on right now. I'd assume most don't get caught. Or go undetected for a many years which is good enough enough. If you have government money on the budget, it makes sense to go with large-volume low-effort attempts rather than try some sort of complex good-cop-bad-cop routine.