Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com...
by o11c on Saturday March 30, 2024 @12:28PM
(#39876286)
The plugin-based case can covered by the notion of multiple "entry points": every library that is intended to be `dlopen`ed is tagged with the name of the interface it provides, and every library that does such `dlopen`ing mentions the names of such interfaces rather than the names of libraries directly. Of course your `ldd` tool has to scan all the libraries on the system to know what might be loaded, but `ldconfig` already does that for libraries not in a private directory.
This might sound like a lot of work for a package-manager-less-language ecosystem at first, but if you consider "tag" as "exports symbol with name", it is in fact already how most C plugin systems work (a few use an incompatible per-library computed name though, or rely entirely on global constructors). So really only the loading programs need to be modified, just like the fixed-name `dlopen`.
Dlopen has drawbacks but also major benefits. We decided the benefits relatively clearly outweigh the drawbacks, but of course people may disagree.
I have proposed a mechanism before, that would expose the list of libs we potentially load via dlopen into an ELF section or ELF note. This could be consumed by things such as packagae managers (for auto-dep generation) and ldd. However there was no interest in getting this landed from anyone else, so I dropped it.
Note that there are various cases where people use dlopen not on hardcoded lib names, but dynamically configured ones, where this would not help. I.e. things like glibc nss or pam or anything else plugin based. But in particular pam kinda matters since that tends to be loaded into almost any kind of security relavant software, including sshd.