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Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by LtWorf on Saturday March 30, 2024 @02:02AM (#39872240)
I'm sure they actually had new features…
Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by Brian_K_White on Saturday March 30, 2024 @03:36AM (#39872690)
What are they specifically?

I don't know how you can be missing the essence of the problem here or that comments point.

Vague claims are meaningless and valueless and are now even worse than that, they are a red flag.

Please don't tell me that you would accept a pr that didn't explain what it did, and why it did it, and how it did it, with code that actually matched up with the claim, and was all actually something you wanted or agreed was a good change to your project.

Updating to the next version of a library is completely unrelated. When you update a library, you don't know what all the changes were to the library, _but the librarys maintainers do_, and you essentially trust that librarys maintainers to be doing their job not accepting random patches that might do anything.

Updating a dependency and trusting a project to be sane is entirely a different prospect from accepting a pr and just trusting that the submitter only did things that are both well intentioned and well executed.

If you don't get this then I for sure will not be using or trusting your library.

Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by CanaryLayout on Saturday March 30, 2024 @02:32AM (#39872372)
Yeah... RISCV routine was put in, then some binary test files were added later that are probably now suspect.

don't miss out on the quality code, like the line that has: i += 4 - 2;

https://git.tukaani.org/?p=xz.git;a=commitdiff;h=50255feeaab...

Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by gamer191 on Saturday March 30, 2024 @03:13AM (#39872563)
> some binary test files were added later that are probably now suspect

That's confirmed

From https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/29/4:

> The files containing the bulk of the exploit are in an obfuscated form in

> tests/files/bad-3-corrupt_lzma2.xz

> tests/files/good-large_compressed.lzma

> committed upstream. They were initially added in

> https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/commit/cf44e4b7f5dfdbf...

Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by m0dest on Saturday March 30, 2024 @06:45AM (#39873585)
It probably makes sense to start isolating build processes from test case resources.
Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by saagarjha on Saturday March 30, 2024 @08:47AM (#39874345)
Sure but then you can smuggle it into basically any other part of the build process…?
Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by jwilk on Saturday March 30, 2024 @07:03AM (#39873690)
FWIW, "4 - 2" is explained earlier in the file:

  // The "-2" is included because the for-loop will
  // always increment by 2. In this case, we want to
  // skip an extra 2 bytes since we used 4 bytes
  // of input.
  i += 4 - 2;