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A comment on Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise. Parent comment

Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by tonyg on Friday March 29, 2024 @04:59PM (#39868949)
Strange protocol. Why not pass a path to a file that should be `touch`d and/or written to, I wonder? Would avoid the complexity of sockets.
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Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by Bu9818 on Friday March 29, 2024 @08:39PM (#39870642)
Services may be in a different mount namespace from systemd for sandboxing or other reasons (also means you have to worry about filesystem permissions I suppose). Passing an fd from the parent (systemd) is a nice direct channel between the processes
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Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by NewJazz on Friday March 29, 2024 @09:29PM (#39870982)
But systemd precisely doesn't pass an FD. If it did, you would just need to write() and close().
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Re:Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server com... by Bu9818 on Friday March 29, 2024 @10:02PM (#39871161)
Yeah I was wrong about that, I confused it with socket-activation passing. The systemd-side socket is available from the process.
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