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Re:New Intermediate Certificates by gray_-_wolf on Tuesday March 19, 2024 @12:33PM (#39757515)
> Please don't pin roots

So what would be the recommended way to protect against government MitM by using some obscure CA?

Re:New Intermediate Certificates by schoen on Tuesday March 19, 2024 @12:40PM (#39757576)
Currently CT logs:

https://certificate.transparency.dev/

Monitor CT for your domain name and if you find an "obscure CA" misissuing for your domain, report it! This may result in the obscure CA getting explicitly distrusted.

At some level this is not that great a solution, but it's really so much better than what we had 13-14 years ago.

Re:New Intermediate Certificates by thrtythreeforty on Tuesday March 19, 2024 @03:15PM (#39759244)
I'm curious: What's the defense mechanism for a dodgy CA not publishing a CT log entry for the misused domain?
Re:New Intermediate Certificates by woodruffw on Tuesday March 19, 2024 @03:29PM (#39759379)
A CT-honoring client should reject an end-entity certificate that isn't accompanied by a SCT. In other words: a dodgy CA that skips CT to avoid disclosure of their mis-issued certificate should be unable to convince any CT-honoring client to accept that certificate.
Re:New Intermediate Certificates by notachatbot123 on Tuesday March 19, 2024 @12:52PM (#39757725)
An adversary might MITM the CT as well.
Re:New Intermediate Certificates by tptacek on Tuesday March 19, 2024 @01:14PM (#39757996)
How?
Re:New Intermediate Certificates by cpach on Wednesday March 20, 2024 @11:06AM (#39767666)
:crickets:
Re:New Intermediate Certificates by michaelt on Tuesday March 19, 2024 @04:48PM (#39760048)
CT logs only mean that if after the horse has bolted, you can start the process to close the door within hours.

That's adequate for low-value targets, but it's hardly sufficient for high-value targets. If a CA mis-issued a cert for *.aws.amazon.com should we be waiting around for a manual process on some mailing list to invalidate it?

Re:New Intermediate Certificates by schoen on Wednesday March 20, 2024 @02:16PM (#39770163)
I agree conceptually, and I think it's sad that we don't have anything more absolute. (I was a fan of HPKP, which has been deprecated as a "footgun" because apparently users often didn't understand what it was doing or weren't cautious enough when using it.)

But the CT system seems to work very well in practice. While the detection and remedy part is awkwardly manual, there are people working hard on them. There are also (following a "you have to disclose all intermediates ahead of time" rule introduced by Mozilla) fewer intermediates and we actually have a list of them.

https://ccadb.my.salesforce-sites.com/ccadb/AllCertificateRe...

Detected incidents involving intentional misissuance are very rare. When unintentional misissuance happens, the responsible CA has to publicly explain how it happened and what it will do to prevent the situation from happening again.

Re:New Intermediate Certificates by xg15 on Tuesday March 19, 2024 @06:32PM (#39761002)
And then what? What are you supposed to do in the meantime until browsers have decided to distrust the CA?

Also, how do you detect "obscure" CAs in the log? If your CT monitoring daemon has some logic to distinguish "good" from "bad" CAs, why not use that logic directly in the app and implement certificate pinning?