I replied with listing a number of websites of security focused organisations whose websites responded to ping, including assorted security services, military, and the pentesting company's own website.
(I didn't object to them querying what actually responded to the ICMP requests - none of them made it past the firewall, which is what replied and revealed nothing of our internal infra - I objected to them ignoring that answer and still insisting it revealed things it demonstrably didn't, and that lack of understanding was consistent through their report)
So we did the British thing and went for a lot of passive-aggressive "oh, but how come it's ok for the CIA and your own website?" etc. to force them on the defensive and demonstrate that a lot of what they did was basically ticking pointless boxes.
We did manage to carve out some willingness in the client organisation to ignore bits and pieces as we clearly increased our credibility relative to the pen testers, but it was a massive pain.