4.4. Hidden Capabilities
Applications using well-known locations should consider that some server administrators might be unaware of their existence (especially on operating systems that hide directories whose names begin with "."). This means that if an attacker has write access to the .well-known directory, they would be able to control its contents, possibly without the administrator realising it.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8615#section-3.1
> Well-known URIs can be registered by third parties (including the expert(s)), if the expert(s) determine that an unregistered well-known URI is widely deployed and not likely to be registered in a timely manner otherwise. Such registrations still are subject to the requirements defined, including the need to reference a specification.
So if some non-IETF protocol starts using a .well-known path, it can get added to the IANA registry even if the protocol authors themselves don’t register it.
These are registrations, not documentation of independent usage, so yes, there’s somebody in charge, the IETF. They can enforce good naming, and do: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8615#section-3. They just apparently have either granted or grandfathered in many exceptions.