News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Conditional Love for AWS Metadata Enumeration by nicornk on Tuesday February 27, 2024 @09:52AM (#39524789)
Yeah, finally a method to figure out the org id of all those snowflake internal stage buckets that snowflake does not want to share for our VPC Endpoint Policies…
Re:Conditional Love for AWS Metadata Enumeration by Temporary_31337 on Tuesday February 27, 2024 @11:26AM (#39525968)
I feel like the potential to abuse this is pretty low but AWS will ‚fix’ this and make IAM even harder
Re:Conditional Love for AWS Metadata Enumeration by ComputerGuru on Tuesday February 27, 2024 @11:42AM (#39526181)
I don’t see how the (to me) obvious fix would make IAM any harder. The bug is that they are treating account owner id as a string, allowing matching against it with prefix operations. It is a guid and should only have equal/not-equal tests.

As there are no “valid” IAM use cases for prefix matching on a resource id (you don’t control the resource id so you can never group resources by using a common prefix, etc) then there is no difficulty imposed by patching this.

The only question is backwards compatibility. If some idiot somewhere actually used a prefix match against a substring in production to match part of their actual resource id, this would presumably break it.

As for potential for harm, I don’t think it’s as low as you make it out to be. It’s hard to be anonymous online. This is another example of that. Forget common crawl or Carvana, and think dissident or whistleblower.

Re:Conditional Love for AWS Metadata Enumeration by zeroimpl on Wednesday February 28, 2024 @09:54AM (#39538697)
Note the ids appear to be 40-bit numbers, which isn’t great for security in the first place. I’m not sure off hand if there’s an efficient way to test all 2^40 values but seems feasible.
Re:Conditional Love for AWS Metadata Enumeration by ComputerGuru on Tuesday February 27, 2024 @11:38AM (#39526130)
If OP is here, your code block has some html characters double-encoded (> and co).

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Can someone double check my understanding of something? AWS doesn’t return the failure reason for auth failure on policy mismatch when access is denied, so you can only know your assumption is correct if the request succeeded.

Does that mean that this only works for resources that have been shared publicly by the upstream owner? If I have an AWS bucket and I only generate signed URLs to access the content and otherwise deny access (standard non-public bucket procedure), this attack wouldn’t work since requests to the base resource need to fulfill both the owner and requester policies and even if your requester policy has a prefix match the upstream access policy will deny the request, no?

Re:Conditional Love for AWS Metadata Enumeration by mdaniel on Tuesday February 27, 2024 @12:14PM (#39526583)
relevant from yesterday, with some lively discussion: https://news.ycombinator1.com/item?id=39512896