Re:New code for SIGILL faults to help identify misbranches o...
by admax88qqq on Thursday February 22, 2024 @09:19PM
(#39476149)
Jesus. The amount of engineering that has to happen to protect against C is astounding.
Re:New code for SIGILL faults to help identify misbranches o...
by wahern on Thursday February 22, 2024 @10:47PM
(#39476715)
Protecting JIT-compiled code, e.g. within browsers, is at least as important a concern. Some would argue much more important, especially as usage of services like Cloudflare Workers increases.
Techniques like CHERI could replace MMUs in some environments, potentially improving performance.
Re:New code for SIGILL faults to help identify misbranches o...
by admax88qqq on Monday February 26, 2024 @12:21PM
(#39514027)
There's no way to express an out of bounds memory read/write in JavaScript. So you don't actually need an MMU, or CHERI, or pointer signing, or any of the stack smashing mitigations put in place for C.
You do have to generate correct code but that's actually a solvable problem, web assembly did it.
In theory this could unlock tons of performance (and free up some silicon) if we could ever get the rest of the system away from C
Re:New code for SIGILL faults to help identify misbranches o...
by dwattttt on Friday February 23, 2024 @04:24AM
(#39478612)
CET is both Indirect Branch Tracking and Shadow Stacks; IBT is the coarse towards CFI, but SSs are a direct ROP mitigation, but enforcing that any address returned to must have been CALL'd from.
ARM's Pointer Authentication extension is an interesting alternative which does all of this in one feature by cryptographically signing pointers in memory.