That is inconsistent with the threat model of a messaging system!
Inherently, a messaging system will deliver a plaintext copy of the message to the recipient(s). Wouldn't be much of a messaging system otherwise.
Once you sent something and it was delivered in plaintext to the recipient, the information disclosure risk is completely out of your control (and out of control of the application in use). The recipient is free to leak it however they wish.
If you don't trust the recipient to keep it private, don't send it.
No need to continuously expire apps in the absence of a protocol breach.
I have no idea if that's what they're concerned about - they may just be being arseholes in this case - but from the outside it seems like a legit reason to build in the capability for app expiration.
I disagree, the worst thing that a messaging system that aims to be "private" can do is to actually not be private. Sending to a known-insecure client is a violation of, like, the one thing signal claims to do.
> If you don't trust the recipient to keep it private, don't send it.
My threat model is some combination of "third party actors who I don't trust" and "second parties who I trust but who are non-experts"[1]. I would like Signal to protect me from the first (by not delivering things to known-insecure clients that can be middlemanned or otherwise discovered) and the second, by having privacy-respecting and mistake-preventing defaults. Things like disappearing messages and such. Keeping my trusted-but-nonexpert peers from making mistakes that can harm either of us in the future is a key part of my threat model.
For example, disappearing messages prevent me from being harmed by my friend, who I trust to discuss things with, not having a lockscreen password and getting warrented by the police. An outdated or third party client that lets you keep them forever, even if well intentioned, can break that aspect of the threat model. And yes, a peer who is actually nefarious can still do that, but that's not my threat model. I think my friends aren't privacy-experts, I don't think they're feds.
[1]: This is, for example, the reason that I think PGP is not a good tool. Even if I do everything right, a well meaning peer who is using the PGP application can unintentionally leak my plaintext when they don't mean to, because of the tool's sharp edges.
Refusing to deliver is inconvenient.