... only if you use the insecure open form. The secure open form has been available and recommended since the release of Perl 5.6.0 in March 2000--twelve years ago.
People who write insecure code, when the language makes it just as easy to write secure code, are to blame for insecure code.
We're not discussing who's to blame, we're discussing whether there's anything to assign blame for.
I can easily use Haskell's type system to disallow the use of UnsafeUserInput in my database abstraction layer, but that requires me to use my types pervasively and correctly.
Suppose that you know the source contains this line:
open(file_handler, "$userinput");
How much work and what assumptions do you need to exploit this? In perl it's that easy: $userinput = "cat /etc/passwd |zenity --text-info |";
open(file_handler, "$userinput");Then you have a massive damn problem, and you could set up the same strawman about almost any language - if you're starting from the premise that you are piping arbitrary user input to a system call unimpeded, all bets are off.
Shall we try some other examples? Let's say you accept input from a user, and dump it unchecked in to output shown to the user via Ruby. OH NOES! Ruby is insecure because it supports CSRF! Or, let's say you use Python and pass in input from a user unimpeded straight to the database without using the quoting mechanisms! OH NOES! Python is insecure because it enables SQL injections! etc etc etc
But wait! you say... Sensible programming languages have specific features to stop these kinds of attacks! And you're right. That's why Perl has taint mode... for when you're dumb enough to pass user input straight to open: http://perldoc.perl.org/perlsec.html#Taint-mode
Of course we should not extrapolate from this to make a judgment on the language. Of course it's nice that security mechanisms are available to alleviate this issue.
It couldn't run your code if it had an uninitialized variable in it, right?
#!/usr/bin/perl
print "Enter filename: ";
$filename = <STDIN>;
open(file_handler, "$filename");
If you see this code, you know that you can execute any command by giving it at the filename prompt and appending a '|' character. For example giving cat /etc/passwd |zenity --text-info | will popup a dialog with the content of /etc/passwd. use strict;
and use warnings;
in there. Thank you for taking the time to put in an example, I understand you better now.
The `open` function used on untrusted input allows arbitrary code execution (I've gotten privilege execution via setuid perl scripts many times this way, as well as getting a shell on the box via web apps allowing this).
While there are many other common things I saw in real world apps, e.g. perl scripts using backticks for command execution and allowing me to run anything I wanted, the `open` one is by far the worst. It's insanely pervasive and incredibly easy to do.