They're arbitrary not because of the ruling (although putting judicial functions in the executive is scarcely better than putting legislative functions there), they're arbitrary because the rule you're being fined for violating was created by the administrative agency fining you rather than Congress.
> your fictive person provides the real people who've bought into it limited liability, which actual humans cannot avail themselves of.
It's typically the actual humans who avail themselves of it. Limited liability means that if you own shares of Exxon (or the S&P 500, which has contained shares of Exxon) and then they get sued and go bankrupt, the plaintiffs don't get to take your house. It's about protecting the investors (commonly ordinary human individuals) rather than the corporation which can still be sued into bankruptcy.
It's also not obvious what one has to do with the other. So you can't sue the corporation for more than what it has, why does that mean you should be able to take their stuff under rules never passed by elected legislators?
This is a weird argument that seems to be being put about recently and it's one of the weirdest legal arguments I've ever seen. Of course rulemaking can be delegated. The rules and rulemaking body remains under oversight, the rules can be overridden by the elected body, etc.
Just a totally strange argument; delegation of authority by elected bodies to specialist subgroups is basically how government works without having 100,000 elected positions, and if your proposed solution is 'okay let's have 100,000 elected positions' you get the local government situation in which people run unopposed because nobody really gives a damn and the local coroner is the town drunk - or people just vote straight ticket.
Just weird. Seems more about destroying the system - which isn't perfect, but works - than about actually solving a problem.
The way you do it is that the specialist subgroup proposes legislation and then the generalist legislature votes on it. And maybe they defer to their proposals 95% of the time, but it means that the unelected specialists can't push through a controversial change without having it approved by the elected legislators.
Have you looked at Congress lately? It would be more like less than 1% of the time. The rest of the time there will be some group that blocks action to try to get concessions on some unrelated issue of theirs.
Rule-making cannot be devolved at the legislature's discretion?
So the legislature can't write a law that says "within bounds X, org Y has the power to manage the rules around thing Z"?
(It would work in the UK, where these powers are most often delegated to the executive via Henry VIII clauses, so this is a genuine question, not a rhetorical one).
Suppose during a lame duck session that the government passed a law delegating rulemaking authority to the Senate, so they could pass new laws without them being voted on by the House or signed by the President, right before the House and Presidency switched parties. Does it make sense for that to be allowed? If not, how is it different when it's the executive the authority is being delegated to, which isn't a part of the legislature at all?
In theory the electorate should also punish a stunt like that, but you know what modern elections are like.
Where I am, it's simple: Parliament (the legislature) is sovereign, and everyone else's power flows from theirs. That puts a hell of a lot power in Parliament's hands (eg general elections were suspended between 1935 and 1945). This is a blessing (agility) and a curse (more vulnerable to bad actors). You've got some laws that are harder to change than others, which puts some brakes on bad actors.
They can't. They control the House, not the Senate, and they'd need both in order to change it back. Or, under the new rule, at least the Senate by itself, which is the part they haven't got.
> This is a blessing (agility) and a curse (more vulnerable to bad actors).
Agility in central government is overrated. If it does nothing you can still take a crack at the problem at the state level or in the private sector, whereas if it does something bad, you're screwed.
One: NLRB rulings are "arbitrary" only if you somehow believe that a regulatory body, whose rulings can be appealed to an Article III court for redress, are intrinsically "arbitrary". Which is a quiet little hide-the-ball attempt at rhetoric.
Two: your fictive person provides the real people who've bought into it limited liability, which actual humans cannot avail themselves of. This is a superpower of your fictive person exists at the literal beneficience of the society that granted its charter; its bad behavior should be more readily addressed than the due process afforded to actual humans.