Re:ISPs Improve Their DNS Hijacking And How To Stop It
by tptacek on Wednesday May 02, 2012 @11:46PM
(#3922299)
This is outdated information. The NSEC record did confirm the nonexistence of DNS names. It also confirmed the identity of every record in your zone; in other words, it allowed anyone in the world to dump your whole zone.
The namedroppers working group eventually conceded that, no, it wasn't OK to disclose every domain name signed under DNSSEC; that, for instance, virtually every large enterprise in the world had made a practice of setting up dual-facing DNS so that the world only saw a preapproved subset of their name.
And so we got the NSEC3 protocol, which uses a hashing scheme similar to Unix password files. So now, instead of directly dumping domains, attackers get to crack them. Daniel J. Bernstein has a couple presentations about how easy this is.
The namedroppers working group eventually conceded that, no, it wasn't OK to disclose every domain name signed under DNSSEC; that, for instance, virtually every large enterprise in the world had made a practice of setting up dual-facing DNS so that the world only saw a preapproved subset of their name.
And so we got the NSEC3 protocol, which uses a hashing scheme similar to Unix password files. So now, instead of directly dumping domains, attackers get to crack them. Daniel J. Bernstein has a couple presentations about how easy this is.
DNSSEC is a bit of a debacle.