Re:How I hacked chess.com with a rookie exploit
by atdt on Friday January 26, 2024 @04:30PM
(#39148721)
Could someone explain how re-directing from a subdomain (chess.com.foo.bar) somehow got past some same-origin check?
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Re:How I hacked chess.com with a rookie exploit
by DistractionRect on Friday January 26, 2024 @05:07PM
(#39149279)
Clearly chess.com was using something like "starts with" to process the re-upload. Basically don't re-upload if it starts with https://chess.com, but filter out if it starts with https://chess.com/registration-invite
Typically same origin policies are relaxed for things like images by default [0]. So they came up with a trampoline, they created a chess.com.theirDomain.tld to get past the re-upload filter, which in turn returned a redirect, which the browser followed.
[0] https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Same-o...
Re:How I hacked chess.com with a rookie exploit
by fnimick on Friday January 26, 2024 @04:57PM
(#39149141)
It wasn't a proper same-origin check - the server code was checking to see if the image was hosted elsewhere, and if so, it would download and self-host it. The code to check if it was on `chess.com` probably just checked to see if the domain included that string, because laziness.
Re:How I hacked chess.com with a rookie exploit
by JakeSkii on Friday January 26, 2024 @06:05PM
(#39150044)
OP Here - Like the others have said, it wasn't a proper same-origin check. We'll never know for sure how it was handled beacuse it was all done server-side but I'm guessing it was something like an if in statement on the FQDN, hence why I was able to get away with pointing it to my own domain.
Re:How I hacked chess.com with a rookie exploit
by betenoire on Friday January 26, 2024 @05:16PM
(#39149409)
it sounded server side code allow-list the source, so it was probably just doing a string prefix check. the code to make the friend relation doesn't happen in the browser