> So, now that this is out, what do the admins for these compromis-able systems do. Presumably RuggedCom has not got a patch out yet, so they just sit there?

There are often no "admins" of these systems. They are installed, the support contract lapses, and they continue to run—vulnerabilities and all. Sometimes there may have been an air-gap, but a desire for remote management results in a 'net link being connected. A VPN or firewall is typically the only security in-place.

The systems often run beyond what we in IT could call a sensible shelf live, because they're the control system for a major plant or piece of infrastructure. Shutting them down to do the upgrade bears a cost of its own (note that I am not condoning this behaviour).

It's disappointing, and dangerous, but hopefully as we move to more generalised hardware and IE60850/IP (over ModBus, DNP3, etc) solutions, things will improve. I think some organisations are running a race they're destined to lose though, especially as intruders set their sights on these weaknesses.

not so long ago botnets were used to blackmail sites into paying DDOS "protection". Ifyou knew enough to command a piece ofplant to exceed it's design parameters you could blackmail quite effectively. Stuxnet but for profit.

This is what I love about HN, always looking to turn a bad situation in to a profitable startup!

Have a look at http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/889195

"Workarounds: ROS users can disable the rsh service and set the number of allowed telnet connections to 0."

there is currently no solution available.

A disconnected system is a secure system. The statement above the line you quoted says

Solution We are currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem.

What's the point of a remote management switch you can't access?