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Re:Uniting the Linux random-number devices by kurikuri on Wednesday December 20, 2023 @05:18PM (#38714394)
The PRNG state is responsible for generating most of the users cryptographic material and is quite important to the system’s security. As such, the PRNG State is a security parameter that should never be exportable nor importable.

There are many new attacks that could surface if import/export were possible; off the top of my head: quiet preloading of an attacker-selected state while the machine is off.

Re:Uniting the Linux random-number devices by yencabulator on Wednesday December 20, 2023 @07:53PM (#38715795)
You don't need to export the current running kernel PRNG internal state, all you need is to save an unpredictable seed that can be used to fill the kernel entropy pool after next boot.

https://systemd.io/RANDOM_SEEDS/

Re:Uniting the Linux random-number devices by 1000thVisitor on Wednesday December 20, 2023 @05:22PM (#38714437)
> quiet preloading of an attacker-selected state while the machine is off.

That attacker with physical access can chose from multiple other attacks, so why bother making this one more secure. They can sniff keyboard strokes, install malware into the UEFI, etc. pp.

Re:Uniting the Linux random-number devices by Asmod4n on Wednesday December 20, 2023 @08:43PM (#38716114)
Just do what netbsd recommends and you should be fine https://man.netbsd.org/urandom.4 They explicitly state you should dog feed the prng on every shutdown and boot and also explain why that isn’t an issue.
Re:Uniting the Linux random-number devices by GoblinSlayer on Thursday December 21, 2023 @03:43AM (#38718280)
>quiet preloading

Just preload the OS then.