Neither generalizes very well w.r.t. how a fish or a bird does it. Nothing really generalizes between the natural version and the mechanical one.
But it's also clear that it's irrelevant. Trying to define useful behavior by categorizing implementation, will only give you categories of implementation. It's clear by behavior that what a submarine does and what a bird does are both for all intents and purposes meeting the definition of what we'd want something to do in order to fly or swim, even though they is no commonality between them and the version in nature.
So by your definition finding it ridiculous to ask "is a transformer conscious" is about as ridiculous as asking the very specific "does a plan flap it's wings"? The point is not to define it by it's implementation, but by what behaviors it exhibits.
If in the future there is no way for me the exterior to distinguish a next gen LLM from a human, animal or other conscious being it becomes irrelevant if it's implemented with transformers. However, while I won't go down that path here, the argument goes even deeper as technically we would expect differences so even if it's not identical to a human it still can be conscious. Just like a dog is conscious but behaves differently than a person does.
“One of the questions that I have been wondering about is whether there have been any discussions exploring the creation of a distinct category, akin to but different from consciousness, that better captures the potential for AI to be sentient. While ‘consciousness’ is a familiar term applicable, to some extent, beyond the human brain, given the associated difficulties, it might be sensible to establish a separate definition to distinguish these two categories.”
Probably new terms should be coined not only for AI “consciousness” but for other aspects of what they are and do as well.
[1] https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.08708