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Re:The best WebAssembly runtime may be no runtime by rockwotj on Monday December 11, 2023 @08:58PM (#38608314)
Sure and containers give you syscall restrictions and OS protections, but you don’t see people embedding containers inside of other applications. People generally sont like sidecars, so embedding wasm makes a lot of sense to have in process
Re:The best WebAssembly runtime may be no runtime by trealira on Tuesday December 12, 2023 @12:33AM (#38609894)
> Sure and containers give you syscall restrictions and OS protections, but you don’t see people embedding containers inside of other applications.

It sounds like you're implying that C coders will opt out of the sandboxing provided by the OS, but that's not possible without coding kernel level code. For userland processes, the sandboxing isn't optional, and your process will be sent a SEGV signal if it tries to access memory it's not allowed to access.

Re:The best WebAssembly runtime may be no runtime by rockwotj on Tuesday December 12, 2023 @09:49AM (#38612830)
I am not implying that. I am just saying it’s more than memory sandboxing Wasm gives.
Re:The best WebAssembly runtime may be no runtime by trealira on Tuesday December 12, 2023 @11:14AM (#38614147)
Then, my bad for misinterpreting what you wrote.
Re:The best WebAssembly runtime may be no runtime by wahern on Tuesday December 12, 2023 @01:10AM (#38610135)
On Linux seccomp is what provides syscall restrictions, and seccomp was originally added to Linux to support untrusted app sandboxing--CPUShare and later Chrome Native Client (NaCl). See https://lwn.net/Articles/332974/. This is why classic seccomp, as opposed to BPF seccomp, only permitted a small, fixed set of syscalls--read, write, and _exit.

A seccomp classic sandboxed process will be at least as secure as any WASM runtime, no matter the engine. Even though the former is running untrusted native code, the attack surface is much more narrow and transparent.