cat private_key_here | head -n -1 | tail -n +2 | base64 -d | xxd
One I created in 2016 is using aes256-cbc with bcrypt for the kdf, which isn't awful at all.
OpenSSH regularly updates its defaults and removes backwards compatibility. Three months ago, they switched from RSA to ed25519 as the default private key type for `ssh-keygen -t`, and in August they disabled RSA/SHA-1.
From the ssh-keygen manual: "It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES."
Rather than spreading FUD, you can just decide for yourself whether AES-128 is secure enough for you. Since we don't know your threat model, only you can decide whether you're okay with publishing AES-128 encrypted private data in a public location.
I recalled this 2018 article[0] titled, "The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext" and was wondering if it is still true. Safe practices are a moving target. One on which I am not qualified to answer, hence my queries.
Good to know that OpenSSH is improving, but is the future uniformly distributed? If you are running a Redhat LTS release, are you getting a secure by default private key protection, or do you have to invoke the correct command?
I default to Github's keygen recommendations, but I can believe that others will run ssh-keygen without arguments.
[0] https://latacora.github.io/blog/2018/08/03/the-default-opens...
I can't speak to Redhat LTS, but I believe they care about security and I've never heard of a compromized Redhat server. As for whether you can then take your private keys from such a server and publish them, I wouldn't advise it, but then again, I wouldn't advise it in general.
Would love to hear differently.
Edit: To put it differently, would it be irresponsible to commit my private key to a public repo if it were locked behind a 32-character passphrase?