Of course, this would require such law to actually survive the lobbying block of the data hoarders in the first place, and that's not likely to happen, alas.
That should be enough info where folks can verify the validity of their subpoena w/o revealing too much data. Including date of issuance and jurisdiction should help prevent using stale IDs to scare someone.
If the subpoena is not sealed, the ID would show all the subpoena info, further narrowing down the ability to replay stale IDs.
I'm definitely missing something obvious though because technical solutions are often not a panacea in cases like this
this would probably work pretty well for these "utility-like big gatekeeper corps" which handle a shitton of subpoena requests, of course it doesn't help if a SWAT team is executing a someone-shout-and-knock-with-that-huge-doorfucker-implement on the wrong house.
in many countries there are state-managed online id systems allowing sending documents to legal persons ... which would make it really really trivial. send the warrant to the department executing it and to the department handling these at Verizon. (I wouldn't be surprised to learn that most of the US states already have something like this, but not used like this.)
it can be optional/voluntary for natural persons, it can be mandatory for companies above some size, etc.
The .gov domain already exists: https://beta.get.gov/domains/before/
What if the head of the agency responsible for verifying these courts institutes a policy that courts will lose their verification for rulings against abortion?
What if two courts in neighboring jurisdictions claim to be the same court? They each submit a different public key, but both can verify they hold the private key that pairs with the public key they submitted. How does the federal agency even verify the identity of a courthouse? Do they need to physically visit them and meet with the judge to tap a Yubikey?
What if somebody steals the YubiKey from the judge? What if a referendum dissolves a jurisdiction?
What is the process for revocation of verification?
Shouldn't the remedy be the guy goes to jail for a long time for forging a search warrant?
The most relevant example I can think of would be a CCP hacker forging a search warrant for a US-based political activist. The government would probably care, but good luck identifying some random Chinese Army hacker, much less extraditing them.
But it's also worth noting that the "vulnerable" system is not the centuries old system of policing. If you get arrested by a fake cop, that system affords you legal remedies - it might take a few days but you'll see justice. The vulnerable system here is Verizon's process for responding to inbound messages claiming to be search warrants. And when this system fails, the victim has effectively no remedy - their stalker already read the data that Verizon sent him.
So that's even less of a reason to increase centralization of the policing system. It won't solve the problem because the problem is with a different system.