Re:OpenPGP Forked into "LibrePGP" by GnuPG's Maintainer Wern...
by arp242 on Thursday December 07, 2023 @12:14PM
(#38558994)
I wish it would just use TOFU ("trust on first use") by default. It's not 100% fool-proof, but actually does cover a large number of use-cases, and is certainly better than nothing.
UI:
"[email protected]: we never seen this sender before, be careful"
"[email protected]: this is verified to be the same sender"
"[email protected]: ACHTUNG! THIS IS SOMEONE ELSE"
You can of course still manually add keys, and you can even do automatic or semi-automatic key rotation with some new header (e.g. "X-New-Key: [...]" that's signed with the old).
Re:OpenPGP Forked into "LibrePGP" by GnuPG's Maintainer Wern...
by woodruffw on Thursday December 07, 2023 @12:21PM
(#38559091)
> You can of course still manually add keys, and you can even do automatic or semi-automatic key rotation with some new header (e.g. "X-New-Key: [...]" that's signed with the old).
Headers aren't part of an encrypted or authenticated body, so this is trivial to perform a key replacement attack against.
Re:OpenPGP Forked into "LibrePGP" by GnuPG's Maintainer Wern...
by arp242 on Thursday December 07, 2023 @12:50PM
(#38559422)
Or MIME part, or change the spec to include some headers (I thought it did?) – that's not an important detail here.
Re:OpenPGP Forked into "LibrePGP" by GnuPG's Maintainer Wern...
by mschuster91 on Thursday December 07, 2023 @01:01PM
(#38559561)
> Headers aren't part of an encrypted or authenticated body, so this is trivial to perform a key replacement attack against.
DKIM can be leveraged for that, although DKIM is one hell of a gun to give someone to shoot themselves.
Re:OpenPGP Forked into "LibrePGP" by GnuPG's Maintainer Wern...
by morelisp on Thursday December 07, 2023 @04:51PM
(#38562306)
DNS records aren't part of the encrypted or authenticated channel, so SSH is trivial to perform a key replacement attack against?
Re:OpenPGP Forked into "LibrePGP" by GnuPG's Maintainer Wern...
by woodruffw on Thursday December 07, 2023 @05:48PM
(#38562867)
Sorry, is this a rhetorical question? I thought the fact that SSH does TOFU was (somewhat) common knowledge, which is why it spits out all kinds of scary MITM warnings when a host fingerprint changes.
If you're connecting to an SSH server for the first time and don't already have a pre-established host fingerprint, then yes: someone who controls your server's DNS records can redirect you to another SSH host, which you'll then (presumably) enter your password into.
Re:OpenPGP Forked into "LibrePGP" by GnuPG's Maintainer Wern...
by fl0ki on Friday December 08, 2023 @03:01PM
(#38573477)
> which you'll then (presumably) enter your password into.
One of the many arguments for using pubkeys so that's all they'll get. Neverthless, the rest of the session could still be anything, and agent forwarding should never be used for untrusted hosts.
[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38557771