News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Rivian software update bricks infotainment system, fix no... by DannyBee on Tuesday November 14, 2023 @05:04PM (#38270479)
It's probably closer to:

The test vehicles accept test/prod signed versions

Regular vehicles only accept prod signed versions

They are otherwise identical.

The test vehicles were sent test signed versions

The prod vehicles were sent the exact same update, signed with test.

This would not be uncommon since the test vehicles probably occasionally run test releases for debugging.

Further, the update is probably multiple signed pieces, and the only part accidentally signed with test was likely infotainment software.

Or something like this.

It's hard to believe they wouldn't test sending badly signed updates, so i have to imagine it's a particularly weird badly signed update.

In other words, i would not assume they are idiots.

Re:Rivian software update bricks infotainment system, fix no... by AlotOfReading on Tuesday November 14, 2023 @05:56PM (#38271025)
It'd be pretty silly to implement an OTA scheme that didn't check signatures before installing updates. That would mean any random attacker could soft-brick the module by sending an invalid image, which a development image should be to a production vehicle.

You could get this situation if the application code accepted signatures the bootloader does not though. I can imagine that accidentally occurring.

Re:Rivian software update bricks infotainment system, fix no... by intern4tional on Tuesday November 14, 2023 @07:43PM (#38271917)
Likely not their code.

OTA is generally developed by tier 1, so this is probably a bug in the tier 1's code. (Samsung, Panasonic, Sony, etc are common tier 1s in this space.)

Re:Rivian software update bricks infotainment system, fix no... by DannyBee on Tuesday November 14, 2023 @09:46PM (#38272726)
Sure, but it could also be signed binaries inside the OTA, a variant of what you are talking about.

IE OTA is a signed package, inside package are also signed binaries. OTA itself is properly signed, a single binary (infotainment) is signed with wrong key.

While most OTA verifiers will verify the OTA signature (which this would pass), most don't verify the individual inside-package binary signatures at install time, only at runtime.

Re:Rivian software update bricks infotainment system, fix no... by AlotOfReading on Wednesday November 15, 2023 @01:54AM (#38274021)
That's not how I've ever implemented OTA, but I'll grant that it's possible if it was designed by someone with no idea what they were doing. Certainly not a good OTA process though, for this among many other reasons.
Re:Rivian software update bricks infotainment system, fix no... by mlyle on Thursday November 16, 2023 @04:07PM (#38295552)
It makes sense for each component to check signatures of its code to prevent various kinds of attacks -- e.g. someone coming and reflashing just infotainment or motor controllers with something malicious.

So, OTA update comes in, containing a bundle of software for different subsystems. It's sent to different subsystems. Then, those subsystems check integrity at startup, but one subsystem's bootloader isn't happy because the firmware looks to be invalid.

Re:Rivian software update bricks infotainment system, fix no... by DannyBee on Thursday November 16, 2023 @09:33PM (#38298635)
Uh, this is a perfectly normal ota process when dealing with multiple embedded systems.

It seems silly to off the cuff assert that it is a bad process or only done by those who have no idea what they are doing.