Unfortunately, Article 45 states that certificates issued by EU-mandated CAs "shall not be subject to any mandatory requirements other than the requirements laid down in paragraph 1" and paragraph 1 does not allow browsers to reject certificates not published in CT logs.
Thus, EU-mandated CAs will be able to issue undetectable MitM certificates.
Delist European CAs until they get their shit together.
The EU had better invest in its own browser if it intends to outlaw encryption.
Big multinationals have employees and assets everywhere that can be threatened.
However smaller organisations operating from a single jurisdiction can only be threatened by their local government (or at least with the consent of their local government).
Firefox is in the US, right? Pale Moon is too iirc and they forked Gecko to make Goanna.
> The text isn't final yet, but is subject to approval behind closed doors in Brussels on November 8.
I know this isn't a satisfying answer, but blame the EU for drafting legislation in secret.
Laws don't go from secret drafting, straight to law. They get public comments, the parliament has to vote on them, the commission has to vote on them (I think - something like that), they go back to drafting to make an amended version that's more acceptable, etc etc... of course the unfinished draft version isn't acceptable.
This isn't the first time everyone's got upset about an unfinished EU law. All previous times, it was shot down by the EU Parliament, who are supposed to represent the citizens.
Oh yeah. I can't believe I didn't put that together. Thanks for spelling it out :-)
The certificate contains signatures from the CT logs. The browser can either accept those signatures or check the CT log itself. This "enforces" CT for the certificate of the site you're accessing, but not necessarily the CA. Of course if a certificate comes up that fails CT logging, that can raise scrutiny of the CA.
I don't quite understand that. How does a browser enforce CT? Even if a browser queries CT logs, they're not that helpful without any context, right? How would a browser get anything useful from the logs beyond knowing a certificate was published to the logs?
Isn't it the job of the domain owner to monitor those logs since they're the only one that's going to know definitively if a certificate is illegitimate?