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Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by JohnFen on Sunday November 05, 2023 @04:52PM (#38156021)
> there's nothing to be done about it anyhow and so you may as well reap the benefits of trusting it.

Alternatively, you can avoid relying on any single thing to be secure and use layered security approaches instead.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by AlotOfReading on Sunday November 05, 2023 @06:38PM (#38156946)
There is no layered security approach that can fully mitigate malicious hardware. Even if you have a perfect cryptosystem where everything is running fully homomorphic encryption so that plaintext literally doesn't exist, you're still susceptible at the boundaries and to metadata leakages.

On real computers you're also susceptible to the hardware simply not executing your code properly and a hundred other things.

Since you can't fully mitigate malicious hardware, you have to state a more limited threat model for there to be any useful discussion.

Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video] by sweetjuly on Monday November 06, 2023 @12:26AM (#38159185)
What security boundary can you hope to hold if the CPU is running malicious code straight out of reset (such as through a bootrom implant)? No amount of layers and defense in depth can paper over the fact that your hardware is physically compromised.

It's the whole trusting-trust thing. We don't really have a way to solve it, so it's best not to burn yourself out on it.