Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video]
by immibis on Sunday November 05, 2023 @12:05PM
(#38153006)
They're dangerous because the same effective security can be turned against the legitimate owner of the machine. The TPM effectively belongs to whoever configured it first.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video]
by JohnFen on Sunday November 05, 2023 @04:36PM
(#38155900)
TPM just stores crypto keys. It does so in a way that the user can't get them, which is my objection to the scheme (because it lets entities set up encrypted channels that I can't monitor).
However, that's the only way it can be turned against the user, and the other user security gains are real.
They reduce the attack surface. Not only in terms of the actual interface, but in terms of who has the ability to subvert the security. Using TPM may or may not be effective security against governments, manufacturers, and the like, but they are effective security against a whole host of other bad actors.
It could be argued that's still a worthwhile improvement. You can engage in other layers of security regardless of whether TPM is being used to help cover the areas TPM may not.