Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video]
by Nextgrid on Sunday November 05, 2023 @09:24AM
(#38151372)
Only problem of software implementations is that they are reliant on the strength of the user-supplied passphrase, so there's a inverse correlation between user experience (ease of typing the passphrase) and security (easy passphrases are also easy to bruteforce).
A TPM provides hardware-backed bruteforce protection which means even an easy passphrase can be made secure as the number of attempts is rate-limited by the TPM (to a level much slower than even the hardest hashes).
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video]
by immibis on Sunday November 05, 2023 @10:57AM
(#38152229)
Then you want your own optional TPM that you trust - such as a YubiKey.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video]
by mjg59 on Sunday November 05, 2023 @11:33AM
(#38152634)
Why is a Yubikey more trustworthy? You don't have the source code, you don't have the hardware design. In addition, a Yubikey is given no information about the system boot state, so is in no position to identify that the system has been tampered with.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video]
by immibis on Sunday November 05, 2023 @11:56AM
(#38152909)
It's just one example. Use a different one if you want.
People tend to trust them more because they belong to them, not Microsoft, or Hollywood, or the board manufacturer.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video]
by mkopec on Sunday November 05, 2023 @03:33PM
(#38155369)
In what manner specifically does a TPM not belong to the user, while a YubiKey does?
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video]
by immibis on Monday November 06, 2023 @09:34AM
(#38163111)
Yubikey gets paid by people who want to do security things. Board manufacturers get paid, indirectly, by Microsoft allowing their boards to run Windows. The incentives are different.
Re:Linux and TPMs with systemd measured boot [video]
by Nextgrid on Sunday November 05, 2023 @12:37PM
(#38153381)
The advantage of a TPM embedded in the platform is that it is aware of the platform's state - the hashes of the firmware, option ROMs and the bootloader/UEFI binary that you're loading. Discrete TPMs are vulnerable to bus interception attacks but newer firmware TPMs are embedded in the CPU/SoC and are invulnerable to this so it's pretty secure.
A YubiKey/external TPM in comparison has no way to know whether it's being fed true PCR readings from the host or fakes from a malicious attacker.
There's a poster below that provides a more reasonable use case for TPM. Headless server where asking for password on boot is undesirable (eg after a power failure)