Today's "sign the book at the poll, and we give you a ballot, which is one of 500 in this precinct-level box" provides at least some level of obfuscation.
I did vote in an election online. Back in 2000, the Arizona Democratic Party ran their (largely a token gesture) primary online as an proof of concept, and I cast my ballot from the main computer lab at ASU. It was convenient, but not breathtakingly more convenient than the mail-in balloting that is a major percentage of users today. Arguably, putting a physical ballot in people's hands is a really strong motivator to actually vote. Although even there, I'm a little more suspect about ballot secrecy; are they really keeping a firewall between the signed perjury declaration on the envelope and the ballot itself?
It's a question of trusting the government to be open about their security measures and not implementing a backdoor.
Dare I say that this software could be open source and shared with other governments. If it's properly secure enough, opening the source shouldn't be a problem, and opens it to public audit.
I think extra layers and MFA should be mandatory for a voting platform, perhaps even a physical MFA key that gets assigned and retrieved in person.
I am just tired of the US dragging their feet on digital voting when we have the technology.