Re:We Don't Generate Elliptic Curves Every Day
by throw0101c on Tuesday October 24, 2023 @02:10PM
(#38002990)
> That's the Menezes and Koblitz argument from the "Enigma" paper […]
PDF:
> In August 2015 the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) released a major policy statement on the need for post-quantum cryp- tography (PQC). This announcement will be a great stimulus to the development, standardization, and commercialization of new quantum- safe algorithms. However, certain peculiarities in the wording and tim- ing of the statement have puzzled many people and given rise to much speculation concerning the NSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and quantum-safe cryptography. Our purpose is to attempt to evaluate some of the theories that have been proposed.
PDF:
> In August 2015 the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) released a major policy statement on the need for post-quantum cryp- tography (PQC). This announcement will be a great stimulus to the development, standardization, and commercialization of new quantum- safe algorithms. However, certain peculiarities in the wording and tim- ing of the statement have puzzled many people and given rise to much speculation concerning the NSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and quantum-safe cryptography. Our purpose is to attempt to evaluate some of the theories that have been proposed.
* https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1018.pdf
Then-coverage:
* https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/10/22/a-riddle...