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Re:We Don't Generate Elliptic Curves Every Day by FiloSottile on Tuesday October 24, 2023 @01:12PM (#38002119)
Footnote [1] is about different strategies to select trustworthy standard parameters. I believe they are all good enough to make it so that if someone can still "backdoor" the result, they are so far ahead of the outside world that they might as well have broken the whole scheme, without influencing the parameters.

[1] https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/parameters/#fn1

(Yes, I hide too much stuff in the footnotes.)

Re:We Don't Generate Elliptic Curves Every Day by comex on Tuesday October 24, 2023 @01:37PM (#38002498)
Out of curiosity, have people considered rigidly defining requirements, but rather than picking the simplest/lowest value that satisfies the requirements, instead having a public “parameter choice ceremony” using a multiparty random number generation protocol to pick a random value that satisfies the requirements? That seems like it would make it much harder to manipulate the value by changing the requirements.
Re:We Don't Generate Elliptic Curves Every Day by woodruffw on Tuesday October 24, 2023 @06:52PM (#38006782)
This probably leads to regress (why trust the multiparty scheme?), and would only be convincing to a tiny fraction of skeptics (asymptotically, the ones who are least likely to be cranks and therefore the least noisy ones).

Meanwhile, a big part of current cryptographic design is recognizing that many of our current primitives have far larger margins than we really need, and that we can squeeze performance out of our schemes by taking a more evidence-based approach to parameter selection/round counts/etc.[1].

[1]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1492